EDF_REGISTRATION_DOCUMENT_2017

PRESENTATION OF EDF GROUP Description of the Group's activities

Long-Lived Low-Level Waste (LLW-LL) LLW-LL comes from the decommissioning of the old NUGG reactors (graphite, processing waste – see section 1.4.1.1.6 “Decommissioning of nuclear power plants”). Given its lifespan, this waste cannot be stored in existing surface facilities (see below), but due to its lower level of activity than that of Long-Lived High- and Intermediate-Level Waste, the Law of 28 June 2006 provides for special subsurface storage. In July 2015, ANDRA transmitted a report on the feasibility of a storage centre on a site located in the Soulaines region (Aube) in France. This report was submitted to the ASN for its opinion. At this stage, uncertainties remain about the site’s capacity to accommodate all of the waste foreseen in the baseline inventory of the LLW-LL storage facility and its availability date. Further studies are planned under the National Plan for the Management of Radioactive Materials and Waste. Short-Lived Low- and Intermediate-Level Waste (LILW-SL) and Very-Low-Level Waste (VLLW) Short-Lived Very Low-, Low- and Intermediate-Level Waste comes from the operation of nuclear facilities (gloves, filters, resins, etc.) and their decommissioning (concrete, scrap, lagging, piping, etc.). They are stored above ground in the Soulaines and Morvilliers storage facilities run by ANDRA in the Aube département. In order to minimise volumes, some waste is treated beforehand by melting or incineration at the Centraco plant owned by SOCODEI, a subsidiary of EDF. In 2016, following the acquisition of the English and Swedish assets of Studsvik, the holding company “Cyclife” was created to bring together all the newly acquired assets and centralise the Group’s internal and external activities in regard to waste treatment. In September 2017 SOCODEI was brought under Cyclife holding. Consideration of future charges relating to the management of spent fuel and long-term management of radioactive waste Each year, EDF makes provisions for the downstream side of the nuclear fuel cycle in France (see note 29 to the consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2017 in section 6.1). Preparing for the future of the nuclear 1.4.1.1.5 fleet in France EDF’s industrial goal for the preparation for the future of the nuclear fleet rests primarily on the following strategic areas: the implementation of technical conditions allowing the extension of the ■ operational life of nuclear power plants beyond 40 years. In the first half of 2016, all technical, economic and governance conditions required to align the accounting amortisation period of the 900MW power plants in the French nuclear fleet with the Group’s industrial strategy were fulfilled; EDF’s Board of Directors therefore approved on 28 July 2016 the extension of the accounting amortisation periods of the power plants of the PWR 900MW series in France (excluding Fessenheim) from 40 to 50 years from 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the approvals for continued operation, granted on a unit-by-unit basis by the ASN after each ten-year inspection; continued safety improvements, primarily by integrating lessons learned from the ■ Fukushima accident in Japan; implementation of a preventive policy with respect to ageing or obsolete ■ equipment. Continued operation of the operating units well after 40 years Additional Safety Assessments (ASA) following the Fukushima accident On 15 September 2011 and in light of the accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan, EDF submitted 19 Additional Safety Assessment reports to the ASN, one for each of its nuclear sites, encompassing all its existing reactors and all those under construction. These assessments consisted of re-examining the defences of existing power plants and those under construction, in light of the events in Japan, taking into account issues set out in the specifications drafted by the safety authorities. Thus, the safety margins were reassessed against the risks of earthquakes and flooding, when

dealing with situations of simultaneous loss of the cooling source and power supplies and the consequences of severe accidents. These assessments also led to inquire whether certain changes to the scenarios planned beyond situations used for the sizing of the protection systems, would lead to a worsening of the consequences in terms of safety (“cliff effects”) and finally to deterministically consider the extreme situations that substantially exceed those used in the design of nuclear installations and subsequent safety reviews. The safety of EDF’s nuclear fleet is based on the principle of continuous improvement: existing and new facilities continuously benefit from feedback from all power plants, and lessons are learnt from incidents and accidents that may occur in the world. Finally, the ASAs also re-examined the rules applied in outsourcing. These analyses confirmed first and foremost the adequate level of security throughout the EDF nuclear power fleet, particularly because of the periodic safety reviews carried out in France since the end of the 1980s and codified by the Law on nuclear transparency and safety (the TSN Law) in June 2006, and codified later in the French Environmental Code. EDF also proposed additional measures to the ASN that exceed those considered for sizing safety systems, to contribute to further improving the current safety level of power plants. In its opinion to the government published on 3 January 2012, the ASN states, on the basis of the analyses of its technical support, that “after the additional safety assessments on priority nuclear facilities, the ASN considers that the facilities examined show an adequate level of safety, and that it will not thus request the immediate shutdown of any of them”. At the same time, the ASN considers that “continuing to operate these facilities requires increasing their robustness, as soon as possible, to an extent beyond existing safety margins, to handle extreme situations”. The ASN also recommended the “hard core” concept and the FARN system (see section 1.4.1.1.3 “Environment, nuclear safety, radiation protection”). The “hard core” will be made up of the plant’s structures, systems and components that can withstand situations studied in connection with ASAs. On 26 June 2012, the ASN made 19 decisions requiring EDF to follow over 600 technical requirements, which set regulatory requirements according to the post-Fukushima action plan. These technical rules require that all nuclear sites must have an organisation and local crisis centres resistant to the occurrence of a large-scale event affecting several facilities. For EDF power plants, the prescribed “hard core” must in particular have “bunkerised” electrical resources in each unit, which must be installed before the end of 2018. In the meantime, a temporary back-up diesel generator was installed at each of the 58 units in 2013. The complete definition of the “hard core” was covered in technical rules issued by the ASN in January 2014. Operating life of EDF’s PWR fleet The provisions of the French Environmental Code do not set a limit on operating life but require a review of facilities every ten years in light of applicable rules and updates of assessments of the risks facilities pose to protected interests, taking into account the state of the facilities, the experience gained during their operation, new developments in nuclear science, and rules applying to similar facilities (safety standards). As part of the studies related to the third ten-year inspections of the 900MW series, in early July 2009 the ASN publicly stated that it had not identified a generic problem that called into question EDF’s ability to control the safety of its 900MW reactors for up to 40 years. The ASN’s general opinion is supplemented by a decision on each reactor. EDF’s industrial strategy is to operate the fleet beyond 40 years in the best conditions of safety and performance, particularly in view of the significant investment linked to the third ten-year inspections on the one hand and to post-Fukushima improvements on the other, but also to the energy needs of France. This target is consistent with trends observed around the world for reactors using similar technologies. To this end, EDF has implemented industrial and R&D action plans. Actions have been launched to renew the major components that can be renewed (see section 1.4.1.1.2. “Operation and technical performance of the nuclear fleet”), and solutions are being studied to demonstrate the capacity of non-replaceable equipment such as the confinement containment building and reactor vessels, to ensure their operation up to 60 years.

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DF I Reference Document 2017