Aéroports de Paris - 2019 Universal registration document

MAIN SHAREHOLDERS 16

CHANGE IN THE CONTROL OF THE COMPANY

16.2 CHANGE IN THE CONTROL OF THE COMPANY RFA

To the best of the Company’s knowledge, there is currently no agreement, the implementation of which could later result in a change of control of the Company. The legal shareholder thresholds that have been breached and of which the Company has been informed since the IPO in June 2006 are as follows: ◆ undershooting by the French government authorities of the legal threshold of two-thirds of the Company’s share capital and the voting rights therein on 1 December 2008. The State had a 60.4% holding following this event; ◆ overshooting by NV Luchthaven Schiphol (the Schiphol Group) of the legal threshold of 5% of the Company’s capital and voting rights therein on 1 December 2008. NV Luchthaven Schiphol (the Schiphol Group) had an 8% holding following this event; ◆ overshooting by Caisse des dépôts et consignations , via the intermediary of the French limited company Fonds Stratégique d’Investissement (FSI) of the legal threshold of 5% of the Company’s capital on 15 July 2009. The Caisse des dépôts et consignations had a direct and indirect holding of 8.63% following this event; ◆ overshooting by the French government authorities and the Fond Stratégique d’Investissement (FSI), acting jointly, of the legal thresholds of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 33.3% and 50% of the Company’s share capital and voting rights therein on 25 November 2009. The government authorities and the FSI had a 60.13% holding following these events; ◆ undershooting by the FSI, controlled by Caisse des dépôts et consignations , of the legal threshold of 5% of the Company’s capital and voting rights on 5 July 2013. The FSI no longer had any holding and the Caisse des dépôts et consignations held 0.7% of the Company’s share capital and voting rights following the event; ◆ overshooting by SOC 15, a company controlled by Vinci, of the legal threshold of 5% of the Company’s share capital and voting rights on 5 July 2013. SOC 15 held 8.0% of the Company’s share capital and voting rights following this event;

◆ overshooting by Crédit Agricole SA, via the intermediary of the French limited company Predica, of the legal threshold of 5% of the Company’s voting rights on 4 April 2016. Predica held 4.81% of the Company’s share capital and 5.55% of its voting rights following this event; ◆ overshooting by Crédit Agricole SA, via the intermediary of the companies it controls, of the legal threshold of 5% of the Company’s share capital on 3 August 2016. It held 5.04% of the Company’s share capital and 5.63% of its voting rights following this event; ◆ overshooting by Predica of the legal threshold of 5% of the Company’s share capital on 5 August 2016. It held 5.01% of the Company’s share capital and 5.62% of the voting rights following this event. Crédit Agricole SA’s holding, via the intermediary of companies it controls, is therefore 5.14% of the share capital. Staff shareholder structure A company investment fund (FCPE), FCPE Aéroparts, was created for the purposes of holding and managing shares acquired by rights-holders linked to companies included within the Group Savings Plan (PEG). The Fund’s Supervisory Board comprises four employee shareholders representing the employee shareholders enrolled in the Plan, and four representatives of Aéroports de Paris and the company’s party to the Group Savings Scheme. Employee-shareholder representatives are elected by employee shareholders, and the Supervisory Board includes at least one shareholder from each segment. In particular, the Supervisory Board exercises the voting rights attached to the shares contained within the fund, and in connection with this appoint one or more authorised representatives to represent the fund at General Meetings of Shareholders of the Company. Double voting rights Pursuant to article L. 225-123 of the French Commercial Code, certain shareholders have been automatically entitled to double voting rights since 3 April 2016 1 .

16.3 SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT

Alliance with Schiphol Group

Inalienability of the shares (“lock up”) Schiphol Group undertakes not to transfer ownership of the shares that it holds in Aéroports de Paris for the entire duration of the cooperation agreement except in certain limited cases; the duration of the inalienability may not, excluding exceptional cases, be less than two years. Aéroports de Paris’ right of first offer/ pre-emptive rights of the French government authorities and Aéroports de Paris Following termination of the cooperation agreement, Aéroports de Paris has a right of first offer for a limited period of time from the termination of the cooperation agreement, enabling it to make an offer to Schiphol Group

As part of the implementation of an industrial cooperation agreement (“the Cooperation Agreement”) signed between Aéroports de Paris and the Schiphol Group on 14 November 2008 for a duration of 12 years starting from 1 December 2008, and making provision for cross- acquisitions between Aéroports de Paris and the Schiphol Group 2 , two agreements have been signed: ◆ a shareholder agreement concerning Aéroports de Paris, signed by the French government authorities and the Schiphol Group, in the presence of Aéroports de Paris; ◆ an exit agreement (“the Exit Agreement”) signed by Aéroports de Paris and the Schiphol Group. The terms of these agreements with regard to the transfer or acquisition of Aéroports de Paris shares are as follows.

1 See also section 19.2 “Provisions of the Articles of Association” of this Universal Registration Document. 2 See also the paragraph “Partnership with Royal Schiphol Group" in section 5.4 "Description of activities by segment”.

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AÉROPORTS DE PARIS ® UNIVERSAL REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 2019

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